Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Options trader turned risk philosopher; author of The Black Swan and Antifragile
- Born
- 1960, Amioun, Lebanon
- Education
- MBA, Wharton (1983); PhD in management science, Paris-Dauphine (1998)
- Trading career
- Derivatives trader at UBS, CS First Boston, Banque Indosuez, CIBC Wood Gundy, Bankers Trust and BNP Paribas
- Firms
- Founded Empirica Capital in 1999 (closed 2004); adviser to Universa Investments from 2007
- Academic post
- Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering, NYU Tandon, since 2008
- Major works
- The Incerto: Fooled by Randomness, The Black Swan, Antifragile, Skin in the Game and others
Biography
Nassim Nicholas Taleb was born in 1960 in Amioun, in northern Lebanon. He studied in Paris, took an MBA at Wharton in 1983 and went into derivatives trading on Wall Street and at European banks.
For roughly two decades he traded currencies and options at UBS, Credit Suisse First Boston, Banque Indosuez, CIBC Wood Gundy, Bankers Trust and BNP Paribas, and also worked as an independent option market maker in Chicago. He reportedly became financially independent after the 1987 crash, thanks to a hedged short position in Eurodollar futures held at First Boston. In 1998 he earned a PhD from Paris-Dauphine with a dissertation on derivatives pricing.
In 1999 he founded Empirica Capital, which bought cheap out-of-the-money options as a bet on rare, violent market moves. One of its funds reportedly returned about 56.9% in 2000; the firm closed in 2004. From 2007 he advised Mark Spitznagel’s Universa Investments, some of whose funds reportedly gained 65–115% in October 2008. He describes his role since 2010 as ‘totally passive’.
Fame came from his books. Fooled by Randomness (2001) argued that luck is routinely mistaken for skill; The Black Swan (2007) landed on the eve of the financial crisis and became a global bestseller; Antifragile (2012) and Skin in the Game (2018) followed, forming a series he calls the Incerto. Since 2008 he has been Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at NYU’s Tandon School of Engineering, and in 2020 he published a technical volume, Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails.
Investment philosophy
Black swans
A Black Swan, in his sense, is an event almost nobody foresaw, with an enormous impact, which people then explain away as obvious in hindsight. History and markets, he argues, are shaped mainly by a handful of such extremes.
Fat tails
Much of finance assumes returns follow something like a bell curve, in which huge moves are vanishingly rare. Real markets, he argues, have fat tails — extreme moves happen far more often than the models allow — so risk measures built on them breed false confidence.
Antifragility
He sorts things into the fragile (harmed by shocks), the robust (unchanged by them) and the antifragile (made stronger by them). The aim is not merely to withstand volatility but to be positioned to gain from disorder.
Avoid ruin first
Any risk that can wipe you out in one go is not worth taking, however attractive the expected return. Survival comes first, because only those still in the game can benefit later.
Skin in the game
Those who make decisions should bear their consequences. He is consistently sceptical of experts and forecasters who advise others without sharing in the losses.
Method
Finding opportunities
He does not try to predict which disaster will strike. He looks for asymmetric payoffs — limited downside, potentially large upside. Options are the classic case: a buyer can lose only the premium, but a violent market move can return many times the cost.
The barbell
He advocates a ‘barbell’ portfolio: most money in extremely safe assets such as Treasury bills and cash, a small portion in high-risk, high-payoff bets, and as little as possible in the apparently ‘moderate’ middle, where tail risks can hide. The exact split depends on the investor.
Tail hedging
Empirica and Universa steadily bought far out-of-the-money put options — insurance that pays off only in a crash. Most expire worthless, so the portfolio bleeds small amounts in normal times; in a collapse that sleeve can soar.
Sizing and risk control
The aim is to cap the worst case, not to smooth day-to-day swings. No leverage that could force a wipe-out, no selling insurance with open-ended losses, and caution about structures that depend on shaky counterparties.
When wrong
For such strategies, being ‘wrong’ usually means long stretches of small losses. The discipline is to fix in advance how much ‘insurance premium’ one can afford each year — neither abandoning the hedge after a calm spell nor overpaying out of fear.
Landmark trades
- 1987
A crash that made him independent
When US stocks collapsed in October 1987 he held a hedged short position in Eurodollar futures at First Boston. The profits reportedly made him financially independent — and gave him a first-hand lesson in the power of rare events that became the seed of his later work.
- 2000
Empirica’s tail strategy
Empirica Capital, founded in 1999, specialised in far out-of-the-money options. Its Empirica Kurtosis fund reportedly returned 56.86% in 2000. But such strategies lose money steadily in quiet years, and the firm closed in 2004.
- 2008
Universa in the financial crisis
He became an adviser to Universa Investments in 2007. During the October 2008 market rout some Universa funds reportedly gained 65–115% in a single month, while The Black Swan, published the year before, was widely read as a warning of the crisis.
- 2020
Universa in the Covid crash
Bloomberg reported that Universa’s tail-risk fund, which he advises, returned 3,612% in March 2020. That figure is measured on the capital committed to the fund itself; critics noted that within a whole portfolio its main effect was to offset losses on the equity holdings.
Limits & controversies
- Tail hedges bleed money in calm years, and their long-run value depends on how often and how hard crises strike. Empirica’s closure in 2004 shows how much patience such strategies demand, and eye-catching figures like 2020’s need to be read in the context of a whole portfolio.
- His statistical claims are contested: some statisticians argue his criticism of conventional methods is overstated, and he and Nobel laureate Myron Scholes have traded public barbs.
- Black swans by definition cannot be forecast, so the framework is better for testing a portfolio’s fragility than for timing trades. His combative style also draws frequent controversy.
How WhyNext uses this framework
When WhyNext cites Taleb, it is asking whether markets have grown complacent about extreme risk — a low VIX, tight credit spreads, rising leverage and concentration — and prompting readers to check whether a portfolio could be knocked out in one blow. It is a fragility check, not a timing signal.
Further reading
- Fooled by Randomness 2001
- The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable 2007
- The Bed of Procrustes 2010
- Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder 2012
- Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life 2018
- Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails 2020
Sources
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nassim_Nicholas_Taleb
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/taleb-advised-universa-tail-risk-fund-returned-3-600-in-march
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universa_Investments
- https://climateerinvest.blogspot.com/2020/06/when-4000-return-is-mirage.html
- https://product.suning.com/0071615541/12447367961.html
Compiled from public sources, with facts checked against them. The method section summarises public statements; it is not the investor's own words and not investment advice.