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Julian Robertson

Tiger Management founder and mentor to a generation of ‘Tiger Cub’ hedge fund managers

Life
Born 1932, Salisbury, North Carolina; died 2022 in Manhattan, aged 90
Education
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1955)
Firm
Tiger Management, founded 1980 with about $8m
Record
31.7% a year after fees from 1980 to the 1998 asset peak, vs 12.7% for the S&P 500
Peak assets
About $22bn in 1998
Legacy
Trained and seeded dozens of ‘Tiger Cub’ managers

Biography

Robertson was born in Salisbury, North Carolina, in 1932, graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1955 and served as a US Navy officer until 1957. He then joined Kidder, Peabody as a stockbroker and eventually ran its asset management arm.

In 1980 he started Tiger Management with about $8m from family, friends and himself. Tiger was a long/short equity fund: it bought stocks it liked and sold short those it expected to fall, aiming to profit from stock selection whatever the market did. From 1980 to its 1998 peak it returned 31.7% a year after fees, against 12.7% for the S&P 500, and lost money in only four of its 21 years. By 1998 it managed about $22bn, making it one of the largest hedge funds in the world.

The fall was swift. When the yen surged against the dollar in October 1998, Tiger reportedly lost nearly $2bn in a matter of hours, and its large stake in US Airways also hurt. As technology stocks soared in 1999 he refused to chase them and shorted richly valued names; performance lagged, investors pulled money, and assets shrank from about $21bn to about $6bn in roughly 18 months. On March 30 2000 he wrote to investors that he was closing the funds and returning all outside capital.

Tiger then managed his own money, and he used it to seed young managers in exchange for a share of their firms — 38 ‘Tiger Seeds’ by 2009. The founders of Viking Global, Lone Pine, Maverick, Coatue and Tiger Global all came out of the Tiger network. Robertson died at his Manhattan home in August 2022, aged 90.

Investment philosophy

Long the best, short the worst

In his 2000 farewell letter he summed up Tiger's method as buying the best stocks and shorting the worst. Longs and shorts came from the same deep fundamental work: which companies were getting stronger, which weaker.

Price must match value

He was a stock picker with a value bent who cared about earnings and valuation. His farewell letter complained that the market had come to be driven by mouse clicks and momentum rather than earnings and price — the reason he would not chase technology stocks.

People over models

He was famous for hiring and developing young analysts, convinced that top talent plus independent research and vigorous debate would keep producing good ideas. The Tiger Cub phenomenon grew out of that.

If you can't understand it, step aside

He chose to close the fund rather than keep risking investors' money in a market he said he did not understand — a sense of fiduciary duty many peers saw as his hallmark.

Method

  1. Finding ideas

    Heavy bottom-up company research: meeting management, comparing competitors, assessing industry structure. Longs were well-run companies at sensible prices; shorts were companies losing their edge or trading at excessive valuations.

  2. Pairing longs and shorts

    Holding both offsets part of the market's swings, so returns depend more on stock selection; shorts also give a way to make money in falling markets.

  3. Macro positions

    At its height Tiger also ran large macro trades such as currency positions. The 1998 yen loss showed how concentrated the damage can be when a big macro position reverses sharply.

  4. Size and liquidity

    As assets ballooned, big holdings such as US Airways became hard to trade. The later lesson: fund size and concentration both erode flexibility.

  5. When wrong

    In 1999–2000 he did not switch to chasing technology stocks; he closed and returned the money. The tech bubble burst shortly afterwards, so his direction was right — but the timing cost him the fund.

Landmark trades

  1. 1980–1998

    Tiger's golden run

    From about $8m to roughly $22bn by 1998, with returns of 31.7% a year after fees against 12.7% for the S&P 500 — one of the best records among equity hedge funds of the era.

  2. 1998

    The yen blow-up

    When the yen spiked against the dollar in early October 1998, Tiger — which began the month with about $20bn — lost nearly $2bn in a matter of hours, according to CNN. It marked the start of Tiger's decline.

  3. 2000

    Closing Tiger

    On March 30 2000 he announced he was closing the funds and returning all outside capital. His letter described the rally in technology, internet and telecom stocks as speculation bound to collapse and conceded that value investing had stopped working for a while. The Nasdaq peaked and fell soon after.

  4. After 2000

    Seeding the Tiger Cubs

    He then backed former staff and young managers with his own money — 38 funds by 2009. Andreas Halvorsen (Viking), Stephen Mandel (Lone Pine), Lee Ainslie (Maverick), Philippe Laffont (Coatue) and Chase Coleman (Tiger Global) all came from this network.

Limits & controversies

How WhyNext uses this framework

When WhyNext uses Robertson's framework it looks at the gap between strong and weak companies within a sector, whether valuations have detached from fundamentals, and how concentrated and crowded big hedge funds — especially the Tiger Cubs — have become.

Further reading

Sources

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Robertson
  2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_Management
  3. https://money.cnn.com/1998/10/12/markets/tiger/
  4. https://hedgefundalpha.com/investor-letters/archives-julian-robertson-closing-letter-investors/
  5. https://www.fortune.com/2022/08/23/julian-robertson-hedge-fund-billionaire-tiger-cubs-dies-at-90
  6. https://investmentnews.com/alternatives/hedge-fund-guru-julian-robertson-dies-at-90/225681
  7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Hwang

Compiled from public sources, with facts checked against them. The method section summarises public statements; it is not the investor's own words and not investment advice.

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