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John Paulson

Hedge fund manager whose 2007 bet against subprime mortgages was dubbed the greatest trade ever

Born
1955, Queens, New York City
Education
BS in finance, NYU (1978); MBA, Harvard Business School (1980)
Firm
Paulson & Co. (founded 1994 with $2m; family office since 2020)
Signature trade
2007 subprime short: funds made over $15bn before fees; he personally made about $4bn
Peak assets
About $38bn in 2011
Book about him
Gregory Zuckerman, The Greatest Trade Ever (2009)

Biography

Paulson was born in Queens in 1955, graduated summa cum laude in finance from NYU in 1978 and earned an MBA from Harvard Business School in 1980 as a Baker Scholar. He worked at Boston Consulting Group, Odyssey Partners, Bear Stearns' M&A group and Gruss Partners — a career spent close to deal-making.

In 1994 he started Paulson & Co. with $2m and one employee, in office space rented from Bear Stearns, focusing on event-driven investing: bets around mergers, restructurings and proxy fights. By 2003 it managed about $300m — a modest firm.

The turn came in 2006–07. Convinced that the quality of US subprime mortgages — loans to weaker borrowers — had collapsed, he used credit default swaps, in effect default insurance on bonds, to bet heavily on subprime securities going bad. When the crisis broke in 2007, his funds made more than $15bn before fees, according to Wall Street Journal reporter Gregory Zuckerman, and he personally took home about $4bn. In 2010 he earned nearly $5bn more, mostly from gold-related investments.

Performance then swung widely: bets on banks and others went wrong in 2011, hitting his flagship funds hard, and when gold slumped in 2013 his gold fund lost about 65% in the first half. Assets shrank from a 2011 peak of about $38bn. In 2020 he returned outside money and turned the firm into a family office. In late 2024 Donald Trump considered him for Treasury secretary before choosing Scott Bessent; Paulson said he withdrew because of complex financial obligations.

Investment philosophy

Find the obvious mispricing

His core idea is to find assets the market has clearly mispriced. In 2006 many subprime securities carried high credit ratings he felt the underlying loans did not deserve; that gap between rating and reality was the opportunity.

Asymmetric bets

A credit default swap costs a relatively small annual premium, capping the loss; if the bonds default, the payout can be many times the cost. He favoured structures that lose little and can win big.

Rooted in event-driven work

Years of merger arbitrage and distressed investing trained him to find value in specific corporate events and in legal and debt structures. The subprime trade was, at heart, detailed work on default events in one class of bonds.

Macro views still need timing

After the crisis he expected money-printing to stoke inflation and loaded up on gold. Its rise and fall showed that even a coherent macro thesis must survive the test of timing and persistence.

Method

  1. Finding ideas

    Start from contradictions between lending standards, ratings and prices. In 2005–06 his team found US mortgage underwriting had loosened sharply while subprime security prices and ratings had not adjusted.

  2. Choosing the instrument

    He expressed the bearish view through CDS and derivatives tied to subprime indices rather than shorting hard-to-borrow bonds. The instrument set both the maximum loss and the carrying cost.

  3. Sizing

    When conviction was high and the odds lopsided he committed a large share of capital, even launching dedicated funds for the trade.

  4. Carry and risk

    CDS premiums must be paid while you wait, eroding returns if the crisis is slow to come. He managed that waiting cost by pacing and sizing the build-up.

  5. When wrong

    After 2011, losing bets and the fall in gold shrank the firm sharply. He eventually returned outside capital and managed only his own money — his answer to years of weak results.

Landmark trades

  1. 2007

    Shorting subprime

    Using CDS and related instruments to bet on subprime defaults, his funds made over $15bn before fees in 2007 and he personally about $4bn. Gregory Zuckerman told the story in The Greatest Trade Ever (2009).

  2. 2010

    The Abacus case

    He helped select assets for Goldman Sachs' Abacus 2007-AC1 deal and bet against it. The SEC sued Goldman for failing to disclose his role to buyers; Goldman settled for $550m in July 2010. Paulson was not charged, but the episode cast an ethical shadow over his trade.

  3. 2010–2013

    Gold's rise and fall

    Seeing gold as an inflation hedge after the crisis, he earned nearly $5bn in 2010 mostly from gold-related bets and was at one point the largest holder of SPDR Gold Trust. When gold slumped in 2013 his gold fund lost about 65% in the first half, Reuters reported.

  4. 2011

    The turn

    In 2011 losing bets on Bank of America, Citigroup and Sino-Forest drove his flagship Advantage funds sharply lower. Assets peaked that year at about $38bn, then outside money kept leaving; in 2020 the firm became a family office.

Limits & controversies

How WhyNext uses this framework

When WhyNext cites Paulson it watches for loosening lending standards, ratings and prices drifting from fundamentals, frothy issuance of risky debt and structured products, and moves in credit hedges such as CDS spreads.

Further reading

Sources

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Paulson
  2. https://www.newsweek.com/hedge-fund-manager-john-paulsons-greatest-trade-ever-76831
  3. https://www.fa-mag.com/news/john-paulson-goes-from-hot-to-not-as-most-client-money-vanishes-33106.html
  4. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/01/john-paulson-is-reportedly-winding-down-his-hedge-funds-these-were-his-last-big-bets.html
  5. https://www.business-standard.com/amp/article/reuters/paulson-s-gold-fund-plunges-65-percent-through-june-113070900037_1.html
  6. https://book.douban.com/subject/30289178/

Compiled from public sources, with facts checked against them. The method section summarises public statements; it is not the investor's own words and not investment advice.

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