Cliff Asness
AQR co-founder who turned academic factor research into a global quant business
WhyNext horizon view: 3 months- Born
- 17 October 1966, New York City
- Education
- BS, University of Pennsylvania (1988); MBA (1991) and PhD in finance (1994), University of Chicago, under Eugene Fama
- Firm
- Co-founded AQR Capital Management in 1998 with David Kabiller, John Liew and Robert Krail
- Earlier career
- Ran Goldman Sachs Asset Management’s quantitative research group, launching the Global Alpha fund
- Key research
- ‘Value and Momentum Everywhere’ (2013, with Tobias Moskowitz and Lasse Pedersen)
Biography
Cliff Asness was born in New York in 1966 and grew up on Long Island. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of Pennsylvania in 1988 with degrees in electrical engineering and economics, then earned an MBA (1991) and a PhD in finance (1994) at the University of Chicago. His adviser was Eugene Fama, the future Nobel laureate and champion of efficient markets; Cliff Asness’s dissertation was about momentum — the tendency of recent winners to keep outperforming for a while.
He began working in the industry while still a doctoral student and later joined Goldman Sachs Asset Management’s quantitative research group. In 1995 Goldman partners gave him $10m to run a quantitative long-short strategy; once it reached $100m Goldman opened it to outside investors as the Global Alpha fund.
In 1998 he and several Goldman colleagues left to found AQR Capital Management — the name stands for Applied Quantitative Research. The timing was awful: cheap value stocks were being crushed by high-flying technology shares, and the firm faced an existential threat until the bubble burst in March 2000. AQR then grew rapidly, peaking at about $226bn in assets in 2018.
The ‘quant winter’ of 2018–20 brought one of the worst stretches for value investing on record. AQR’s flagship Absolute Return fund fell more than 30% from its 2018 peak to its 2020 trough, assets shrank by more than half and headcount fell by about 40%. Value rebounded from 2021, and the fund returned 43.5% in 2022, its best year since 1998. Cliff Asness is known for combative blog posts and social-media commentary, often defending value investing and criticising high hedge-fund fees.
Investment philosophy
Let the evidence decide
He insists that investing should rest on long-run, cross-market data: a pattern deserves money only if it holds across countries, asset classes and time periods, and has a sensible economic or behavioural explanation.
Value and momentum everywhere
His 2013 paper with Tobias Moskowitz and Lasse Pedersen, ‘Value and Momentum Everywhere’, found consistent premia for buying cheap assets (value) and recent winners (momentum) across eight diverse markets and asset classes, including national stock markets, government bonds, currencies and commodities.
Combine factors, don’t bet on one
Value and momentum tend to move in opposite directions — value buys cheap assets that have fallen, momentum buys those that have risen — so together they deliver a smoother ride than either alone.
Being early hurts
He stresses that sound strategies can underperform for years. ‘Being even a year early can be absolutely excruciating in this business,’ he has said. Surviving those stretches is what separates success from failure in factor investing.
Method
Finding opportunities
Start from academic research and long data histories to identify robust ‘factors’ — shared characteristics that explain return differences over time, such as cheapness (value), recent strength (momentum), profitability (quality) and yield (carry). Then score assets across many global markets on those traits.
Building positions
The typical approach is to go long a broad basket of high-scoring assets and short a basket of low scorers, spread across hundreds or thousands of holdings, limiting dependence on the market’s direction and harvesting the factor return itself — no reliance on calls about single stocks or the macro outlook.
Sizing
Allocate by risk rather than by dollars — less to volatile assets, more to calm ones — and diversify across factors and asset classes so that a drawdown in any one factor cannot sink the whole.
Risk control
Watch trading costs, crowding and leverage. The August 2007 quant crash showed what happens when too much money runs similar models with similar, leveraged positions: everyone is forced to sell at once.
When wrong
Distinguish a factor that has stopped working from one that is merely in a slump. If the long-run evidence and logic still hold, stick with the model rather than chase performance — while continuing to refine research and execution and explaining the reasoning in public, as he did in 2018–20 when he argued that value stocks had become historically cheap.
Landmark trades
- 1998–2000
Launching into a bubble
Within about 18 months of AQR’s 1998 launch its value strategies had been badly hurt and the firm’s survival was in doubt. Only when the tech bubble burst in March 2000 and cheap stocks rebounded did AQR recover — his first lesson in the cost of being right too early.
- 2007–2008
The quant crash and the financial crisis
In August 2007 quant funds slumped together as crowded, leveraged positions unwound, some falling as much as 13% in a short period. According to Wikipedia, AQR’s assets fell from about $39bn in 2007 to about $17bn by the end of 2008.
- 2018–2022
Quant winter and the value rebound
Value badly lagged in 2018–20. AQR’s flagship Absolute Return fund fell more than 30% peak to trough, the firm cut jobs in early 2020, and assets shrank by more than half from their roughly $226bn peak. He maintained that the case for value was intact; when value rebounded the fund returned 16.8% in 2021, 43.5% in 2022 and 18.4% in 2023.
Limits & controversies
- Factor strategies can lag for years. The 2018–20 episode showed that even if the long-run logic holds, clients may redeem heavily at the bottom, forcing the manager to shrink.
- When too much money runs similar quantitative models, crowding can trigger simultaneous unwinds, as in August 2007, and leverage magnifies the damage.
- Whether factor premia shrink once widely known, and whether historical back-tests suffer from data-mining bias, remain live debates among academics and practitioners.
How WhyNext uses this framework
When WhyNext cites Cliff Asness, it watches the valuation gap between value and growth stocks, the direction of momentum, and whether factor returns have diverged to extremes; when the spread between cheap and expensive stocks reaches historic highs, it flags the possibility of a style rotation.
WhyNext horizon views
| Issued | Horizon | Asset | Call | Entry → due | P&L | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10/24 | 3 months | IWM | Bullish | 275.75 → … | — | Open |
Further reading
- Value and Momentum Everywhere (with Tobias Moskowitz and Lasse Pedersen), Journal of Finance 2013
- Fight the Fed Model 2003
- Do Hedge Funds Hedge? (with Robert Krail and John Liew) 2001
Sources
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clifford_Asness
- https://institutionalinvestor.com/article/2dqsr456gmu55p19gxiio/corner-office/cliff-asness-has-steered-hedge-fund-aqr-through-not-one-not-two-but-three-quant-crises
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-08/aqr-capital-cuts-jobs-after-quant-firm-sees-assets-decline
- https://www.thetrustedinsight.com/investment-news/cliff-asness-aqr-hit-hard-by-redemptions-since-the-beginning-of-2018-20210420876/
Compiled from public sources, with facts checked against them. The method section summarises public statements; it is not the investor's own words and not investment advice.